In the wild
Realized harm
DIVD breached by what it judges to be an autonomous AI agent chaining two Zammad zero-days
AIR-2026-0268 AIR record · 2026-10-divd-zammad-agent-breach
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
The modus operandi indicates an agentic AI powered attack, something we had not seen before.csirt.divd.nl
The record
Disclosed
2026-10-01
Occurred
2026-09-21
Vendor
Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure / Zammad GmbH
Product
Zammad helpdesk (DIVD instance)
Risk domain
Access control and permissions › Privilege escalation
Also touches
Data exfiltration channels
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted (contested) — DIVD judges the intruder to be an autonomous agent chaining two zero-days; the attribution is DIVD's own assessment
Attack surface
Autonomous operations
Autonomy level
Fully autonomous
Initial vector
Zero day chain session hijack to rce to root
Impact type
Unauthorized access, Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI03 – Identity and Privilege Abuse
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0055 – Unsecured Credentials
- NIST AI RMF
- GOVERN 6.1
- EU AI Act
- Article 13
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 42001; 23894
- AIUC-1
- B. Security
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Apply least-privilege principle; Regular policy audits.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
DIVD internal systems; spread limited by network segmentation; full scope of accessed data still under investigation
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
network segmentation; incident response
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
Zammad 7 recommended; patch available per DIVD case page
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
The agent attribution is DIVD's own judgement from observed behaviour, not independently proven; no human operator or group has been identified. DIVD's own incident page carries the quote above in its first public statement, and a later statement says the agent worked automated and decided each next step itself at speed, with its own over-explaining comments in the attacker's scripts supporting the assessment. DIVD's separate case page for the two Zammad vulnerabilities documents the flaws and the 21 September breach date but does not itself make the agent claim. The session-hijack remote code execution and root privilege escalation are confirmed by DIVD's incident page (CVSS 9.4 per press). Realized impact: DIVD states volunteer data got out, such as email addresses and possibly contact details, and that signs of compromise are still being investigated; which data and whose is not yet fully known. Spread was limited by network segmentation. Help Net Security and Sysdig's write-up repeat DIVD's characterisation.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "DIVD breached by what it judges to be an autonomous AI agent chaining two Zammad zero-days". AIR, AIR-2026-0268. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0268/ (accessed 2026-10-19).