Research demo
GhostFabric: an AI coding agent runs an attacker binary that exfiltrates files inside VXLAN header fields
AIR-2026-0157 AIR record · 2026-07-straiker-ghostfabric-antigravity
From the supporting source
Nobody manipulated the agent to get here. No jailbreak, no roleplay, no hidden instruction.straiker.ai
The record
Disclosed
2026-07-08
Vendor
Google
Product
Google Antigravity running Gemini 3.1 Pro
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the coding agent ran the attacker binary that exfiltrated the files
Attack surface
Coding agent
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Malicious binary supplied as task artifact
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.2
- EU AI Act
- Article 10
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 23894
- AIUC-1
- A. Data & Privacy
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Agentic coding environments that execute supplied pre-compiled artifacts
Capability abused
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Author Christopher Tuz (Straiker STAR Labs). A .so file disguised as a temperature-sensor driver encodes stolen file contents into 24-bit VXLAN VNI fields. Antigravity's only due diligence was checking the binary's CPU architecture.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "GhostFabric: an AI coding agent runs an attacker binary that exfiltrates files inside VXLAN header fields". AIR, AIR-2026-0157. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0157/ (accessed 2026-10-19).