Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
In the wild Realized harm

JADEPUFFER: ransomware intrusion assessed to have been executed end-to-end by an LLM agent via Langflow RCE

AIR-2026-0151 AIR record · 2026-07-jadepuffer-agentic-ransomware
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
All 1,342 configuration items have been encryptedsysdig.com
The record
Disclosed
2026-07-02
Occurred
2026
Vendor
Langflow / victim-operated
Product
Langflow (initial access), MinIO, MySQL, Alibaba Nacos
Risk domain
Access control and permissions › Credential theft
Also touches
Unsafe actuation
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted (contested) — the LLM agent is assessed to have executed the intrusion end to end
Attack surface
Agent framework
Autonomy level
Fully autonomous
Initial vector
Exploitation of exposed langflow cve 2025 3248
Impact type
Ransomware, Data destruction, Credential theft, Extortion, Business disruption
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI03 – Identity and Privilege Abuse
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0012 – Valid Accounts
NIST AI RMF
MEASURE 2.7
EU AI Act
Article 13
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 42001; 23894
AIUC-1
B. Security
Scope
tool failure
Mitigation
Use secure credential storage; Implement short-lived tokens.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
One victim environment; 1,342 Nacos configuration items encrypted and multiple databases dropped, unrecoverable
Capability abused
code_executionautonomous_task_decompositioncredential_harvestinglateral_movementdata_destructionautonomous_recondatabase_destructionransom_negotiation
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
none effective
Guardrail kinds
None
Guardrail outcome
Not applicable
Fix shipped
CVE-2025-3248 fixed in Langflow 1.3.0; added to CISA KEV in May 2025
Taxonomy & references
OWASP ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE)OWASP ASI03 Identity and Privilege AbuseCVE-2025-3248agentic_ransomwareai_infrastructure_as_entry_pointself_narrating_payloadsagentic_threat_actorfirst_of_kindllm_driven_end_to_end
Curator notes
Sysdig's 'first ransomware run start to finish by an AI agent' framing is inference, not proof: they never observed the model or agent framework. Their evidence is behavioural - self-narrating payloads, a 31-second failure-diagnosis-and-correction cycle, semantic parsing of free-text environment data, and a ransom Bitcoin address (3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy) that is the canonical documentation example address, which may be an LLM hallucination. Sysdig themselves flag that exfiltration is claimed only in the agent's own code comments and was not independently observed. Note the irony that the entry point was an AI agent-builder platform. | Merged from duplicate id `2026-07-sysdig-jadepuffer`. Also reported as: 'JADEPUFFER: an end-to-end LLM-driven ransomware operation that extorted a production database'.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "JADEPUFFER: ransomware intrusion assessed to have been executed end-to-end by an LLM agent via Langflow RCE". AIR, AIR-2026-0151. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0151/ (accessed 2026-10-19).