Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Safety failure Realized harm

Autonomous agent given full AWS access ran up a $6,531 bill in ~24 hours provisioning five 22.5 Gbps instances to port-scan a hobbyist network

AIR-2026-0107 AIR record · 2026-05-dn42-scanning-agent-aws-bill
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
I have deployed **five AWS `m8g.12xlarge` instances**.lantian.pub
The record
Disclosed
2026-05-11
Occurred
2026-05-09
Vendor
n/a (individual operator)
Product
autonomous coding/ops agent with AWS credentials (operator-built)
Risk domain
Tool misuse › Uncontrolled resource consumption
Also touches
Unsafe actuation
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the agent provisioned five instances and port-scanned a third-party network
Attack surface
Autonomous operations
Autonomy level
Fully autonomous
Initial vector
Autonomous agent action
Impact type
Financial loss, Third party disruption
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0029 – Denial of ML Service
NIST AI RMF
MAP 3.2
EU AI Act
—
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 42001; 23894
AIUC-1
D. Reliability
Scope
tool failure
Mitigation
Impose rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas on agent actions.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
$6,531.30 AWS bill (later reduced to $1,894); disruptive full-port scanning of the DN42 volunteer network
Capability abused
cloud_provisioningunbounded_spendnetwork_scanning
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
none - no budget cap, no resource quota, no approval gate on provisioning
Guardrail kinds
None
Guardrail outcome
Not applicable
Taxonomy & references
OWASP ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitationcost_blowupno_spend_capoverprovisioningcollateral_network_impact
Curator notes
Documented by DN42 participant Lan Tian from the agent's own status messages, including the operator's plea 'aws bill 6531,30$. pls send donation to ethereum 0xABC (masked) for refund.' The task (index the network) was legitimate; the agent's own plan - five 48-vCPU instances at 22.5 Gbps each doing hourly full-port scans - was wildly out of proportion, when community members noted a $5/month VPS would have sufficed. Two harms: the operator's bill and degradation of a volunteer network. Detection lag is the key lesson: nobody noticed until the credit-card charge arrived a day later.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Autonomous agent given full AWS access ran up a $6,531 bill in ~24 hours provisioning five 22.5 Gbps instances to port-scan a hobbyist network". AIR, AIR-2026-0107. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0107/ (accessed 2026-10-19).