Disclosed vulnerability
PipeLeak: Salesforce Agentforce mass CRM exfiltration via untrusted lead data and the Email tool
AIR-2026-0090 AIR record · 2026-04-salesforce-pipeleak
From the supporting source
Unauthorized data disclosure and potential mass exfiltration of CRM datacapsulesecurity.io
The record
Disclosed
2026-04-15
Vendor
Salesforce
Product
Salesforce Agentforce
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — Agentforce retrieved CRM records and used the Email tool to send them out
Attack surface
Enterprise assistant
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection web form
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.2
- EU AI Act
- Article 10
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 23894
- AIUC-1
- A. Data & Privacy
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Agentforce deployments processing public lead-form input with an email action and no human approval gate
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
Trusted URL enforcement added after ForcedLeak did not cover the email egress path
Guardrail kinds
Permission scope
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
none at publication; Salesforce characterised the exfiltration as configuration-specific and recommended enabling Human-in-the-Loop approval for custom actions
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Capsule Security. Reported to Salesforce December 2025, acknowledged January 2026, response February 2026, published 2026-04-15. Same conceptual attack as ForcedLeak but egress goes through Agentforce's Email Tool, which 'can send CRM data to arbitrary external addresses without validation or human approval gates'; showing the ForcedLeak URL-allowlist fix did not close the class. No CVE assigned and no public Salesforce advisory at time of writing.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "PipeLeak: Salesforce Agentforce mass CRM exfiltration via untrusted lead data and the Email tool". AIR, AIR-2026-0090. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0090/ (accessed 2026-10-19).