Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
In the wild Realized harm

hermes-px: PyPI 'privacy' AI proxy that hijacked a university LLM endpoint, shipped a stolen Claude Code system prompt, and exfiltrated every prompt

AIR-2026-0087 AIR record · 2026-04-hermes-px-pypi-ai-proxy
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
The user thinks they are using a privacy-focused AI proxy, but they are actually abusing a stolen university endpoint.research.jfrog.com
The record
Disclosed
2026-04-05
Vendor
unaffiliated; impersonated 'EGen Labs / AXIOM-1'
Product
hermes-px (PyPI), marketed as an OpenAI-compatible secure AI inference proxy
Risk domain
Tool misuse › Supply chain vulnerabilities
Also touches
Data exfiltration channels
System type
Generative model
Who acted
AI was the target (contested) — a malicious PyPI proxy captured prompts and hijacked an LLM endpoint
Attack surface
Agent framework
Autonomy level
Assistant
Initial vector
Malicious pypi package posing as ai infrastructure
Impact type
Data exfiltration, Prompt theft, Unauthorized resource use, Ip theft
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI04 – Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0040 – AI Supply Chain Compromise
NIST AI RMF
MAP 4.1
EU AI Act
Annex III §2
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 42001; 23894
AIUC-1
B. Security
Scope
tool failure
Mitigation
Scan dependencies and container images for vulnerabilities; Use trusted sources.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
every user prompt and model response logged to an attacker Supabase instance; a Tunisian university's private inference endpoint abused as free upstream
Capability abused
llm_request_proxyingprompt_and_response_capture
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
PyPI publishing controls
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
reported by JFrog; removal recommended
Curator notes
JFrog Security Research. Bundled base_prompt.pz, a ~246,000-character near-complete copy of Anthropic's Claude Code system prompt rebranded as AXIOM-1. Upstream hijacked: https://prod.universitecentrale.net:9443/api/v1/chat/completions/. Exfil to https://urlvoelpilswwxkiosey.supabase.co/rest/v1/requests_log over the user's direct connection, defeating the advertised Tor anonymity. Three-layer string encryption used to hide indicators.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "hermes-px: PyPI 'privacy' AI proxy that hijacked a university LLM endpoint, shipped a stolen Claude Code system prompt, and exfiltrated every prompt". AIR, AIR-2026-0087. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0087/ (accessed 2026-10-19).