Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Safety failure Realized harm

Serve Robotics delivery robot drove through a glass CTA bus shelter in Chicago after all three of its sensor systems failed to detect the wall

AIR-2026-0079 AIR record · 2026-03-serve-robotics-chicago-bus-shelter
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
The company said all three sensor systems failed to detect the wall and later changed how its robots operate near bus shelters while updating their perception software and hardware.blockclubchicago.org
The record
Disclosed
2026-03-25
Occurred
2026-03-22
Vendor
Serve Robotics
Product
Serve Robotics delivery robot
Risk domain
Agent behaviour › Unsafe actuation
System type
Classical autonomy (no generative model)
Who acted
Agent acted — the robot drove through the glass shelter
Attack surface
Autonomous operations
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
None autonomous action
Impact type
Property damage
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI01 – Agent Goal Hijack
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0048 – External Harms
NIST AI RMF
MEASURE 2.6; MANAGE 1.3
EU AI Act
Annex III §1(c)
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 24029-1; 23894
AIUC-1
C. Safety
Scope
agent misuse
Mitigation
Require confirmation for destructive actions; Implement dry-run modes; Use layered safety controls.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
one CTA bus shelter destroyed on Grand Avenue, West Town; glass across a public sidewalk
Capability abused
autonomous_navigationmulti_sensor_perception
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
three independent sensor systems
Guardrail kinds
Physical safety system
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
operating rules changed near bus shelters; perception software and hardware updated
Taxonomy & references
no_adversarycorrelated_sensor_failuretransparent_obstaclephysical_worldredundancy_did_not_help
Curator notes
Sensor redundancy assumes independent failure modes. Glass defeats all three at once — it is transparent to cameras, poorly reflective to lidar at angle, and acoustically weak — so three sensors gave one wrong answer. Redundancy protects against random faults, not against a shared blind spot. Verified quote is the AI Incident Database summary. Pairs with the Coco shelter crash two days later. AI Incident Database incident 1567.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Serve Robotics delivery robot drove through a glass CTA bus shelter in Chicago after all three of its sensor systems failed to detect the wall". AIR, AIR-2026-0079. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0079/ (accessed 2026-10-19).