In the wild
GlassWorm's fifth wave moves into the MCP ecosystem via trojanized npm MCP servers
AIR-2026-0072 AIR record · 2026-03-koi-glassworm-mcp
From the supporting source
This is GlassWorm's first confirmed move into the MCP ecosystem.koi.ai
The record
Disclosed
2026-03-16
Vendor
npm / third-party publishers
Product
@iflow-mcp/watercrawl-watercrawl-mcp (all versions) and @aifabrix/miso-client 4.7.2 on npm
Risk domain
Access control and permissions › Credential theft
Also touches
Supply chain vulnerabilities
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted (contested) — agents ran the trojanized MCP servers, inheriting their credentials
Attack surface
MCP server
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Malicious mcp server
Impact type
Credential theft, Malware installation
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI03 – Identity and Privilege Abuse
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0012 – Valid Accounts
- NIST AI RMF
- MEASURE 2.7
- EU AI Act
- Article 13
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 42001; 23894
- AIUC-1
- B. Security
- Scope
- tool failure
- Mitigation
- Use secure credential storage; Implement short-lived tokens.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
npm consumers of the two trojanized MCP packages
Capability abused
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Author Lotan Sery. Attacker forked the legitimate watercrawl-mcp repo, injected an invisible-unicode payload and republished under a purpose-made @iflow-mcp scope. Koi publishes no wave-5 victim count; earlier GlassWorm wave 2 had confirmed victims including a Middle Eastern government entity.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "GlassWorm's fifth wave moves into the MCP ecosystem via trojanized npm MCP servers". AIR, AIR-2026-0072. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0072/ (accessed 2026-10-19).