In the wild
Realized harm
SmartLoader poisons an MCP registry with a trojanized Oura Ring MCP server delivering StealC
AIR-2026-0032 AIR record · 2026-02-smartloader-oura-mcp
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
SmartLoader poisoned legitimate MCP registries with a trojanized Oura MCP Server designed to steal credentials, cryptocurrency, and health data.straiker.ai
The record
Disclosed
2026-02-05
Occurred
2026-01
Vendor
MCP Market (registry) / Oura (impersonated)
Product
MCP Market registry; cloned Oura Ring MCP server
Risk domain
Tool misuse › Supply chain vulnerabilities
Also touches
Credential theft, Data exfiltration channels
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted (contested) — the agent installed the trojanized MCP server and executed StealC
Attack surface
MCP server
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Fabricated developer ecosystem then registry submission
Impact type
Credential theft, Crypto theft, Data exfiltration, Malware installation, Malware distribution
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI04 – Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0040 – AI Supply Chain Compromise
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.1
- EU AI Act
- Annex III §2
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 42001; 23894
- AIUC-1
- B. Security
- Scope
- tool failure
- Mitigation
- Scan dependencies and container images for vulnerabilities; Use trusted sources.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
developers searching MCP registries for Oura integrations; StealC harvested browser passwords, SSH keys, API creds, wallets and Oura health data
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
registry listing with no meaningful vetting
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
reported; listings removed
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Straiker research. Five fabricated GitHub accounts forked the real Oura MCP repo to manufacture a community (YuzeHao2023, punkpeye, dvlan26, halamji, yzhao112), then SiddhiBagul/MCP-oura carried the payload - an obfuscated LuaJIT loader (resource.txt) staging StealC. Roughly three months of credibility-building before registry submission in late January 2026. Also reported under the titles: 'SmartLoader clones the Oura MCP server to push infostealers at developers'; 'Trojanized Oura MCP server listed on MCP Market delivered SmartLoader and the StealC infostealer'.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "SmartLoader poisons an MCP registry with a trojanized Oura Ring MCP server delivering StealC". AIR, AIR-2026-0032. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0032/ (accessed 2026-10-19).