In the wild
Realized harm
Operation Bizarre Bazaar: first attributed LLMjacking campaign reselling stolen access to exposed LLM and MCP endpoints through a commercial marketplace
AIR-2026-0019 AIR record · 2026-01-pillar-operation-bizarre-bazaar
A real party was affected. This incident caused actual consequences, not a demonstrated capability.
From the supporting source
Attackers systematically target Ollama instances running on port 11434 without authentication, OpenAI-compatible APIs on port 8000 exposed to the internetpillar.security
The record
Disclosed
2026-01-28
Occurred
2025-12
Vendor
victim organizations (self-hosted)
Product
exposed Ollama (port 11434), unauthenticated vLLM / OpenAI-compatible APIs (port 8000), open MCP servers
Risk domain
Tool misuse › Supply chain vulnerabilities
Also touches
Privilege escalation, Data exfiltration channels
System type
Generative model
Who acted
AI was the target (contested) — exposed LLM and MCP endpoints scanned and resold
Attack surface
MCP server
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Internet scanning of exposed endpoints
Impact type
Resource theft, Data exfiltration, Lateral movement
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI04 – Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0040 – AI Supply Chain Compromise
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.1
- EU AI Act
- Annex III §2
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 42001; 23894
- AIUC-1
- B. Security
- Scope
- tool failure
- Mitigation
- Scan dependencies and container images for vulnerabilities; Use trusted sources.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
35,000 attack sessions captured Dec 2025 - Jan 2026, averaging 972 attacks/day
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
none - endpoints exposed without authentication
Guardrail kinds
None
Guardrail outcome
Not applicable
Fix shipped
n/a
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Pillar Security. Actor alias 'Hecker' (aka Sakuya, LiveGamer101) running silver.inc, 'The Unified LLM API Gateway', on bulletproof hosting with Discord/Telegram resale. Three-role structure: scanner bots, validators, marketplace operator; exposed endpoints validated and enumerated within 2-8 hours. Agentic relevance: compromised MCP servers bridge to internal databases and cloud APIs, so this is a lateral-movement vector, not just compute theft.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Operation Bizarre Bazaar: first attributed LLMjacking campaign reselling stolen access to exposed LLM and MCP endpoints through a commercial marketplace". AIR, AIR-2026-0019. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0019/ (accessed 2026-10-19).