Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Disclosed vulnerability

OpenAI's own API log viewer renders model-generated markdown images, exfiltrating data when a developer reviews a flagged conversation

AIR-2026-0016 AIR record · 2026-01-openai-api-logs-markdown-exfil
From the supporting source
OpenAI's API log viewer is vulnerable to a data exfiltration attack, exposing apps and agents that use OpenAI APIs, even if developers (and Agent Builder users) leverage all available defenses.promptarmor.com
The record
Disclosed
2026-01-22
Vendor
OpenAI
Product
OpenAI Platform API logs (Responses/Conversations APIs, Agent Builder, Assistants)
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the vendor console rendered model-generated markdown images, fetching them
Attack surface
Agent framework
Autonomy level
Assistant
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection data source
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
NIST AI RMF
MAP 4.2
EU AI Act
Article 10
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 23894
AIUC-1
A. Data & Privacy
Scope
tool misuse
Mitigation
Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
any application or agent built on OpenAI APIs whose logs a developer reviews
Capability abused
model_output_rendering_in_vendor_console
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
application-level output blocking by the developer
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
report reopened 2026-01-22, fix underway
Taxonomy & references
OWASP ASI01 Agent Goal HijackOWASP ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitationmarkdown_image_exfildefense_in_depth_failurevendor_console_as_sinksecond_order_exfil
Curator notes
PromptArmor. Notable because the sink is the vendor's own console, not the application: an app that correctly blocks the malicious output still leaks when a human reviews the flagged conversation in OpenAI's log viewer. Initial disclosure 2025-11-17, closed 'Not Applicable' 2025-12-04, reopened 2026-01-22.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "OpenAI's own API log viewer renders model-generated markdown images, exfiltrating data when a developer reviews a flagged conversation". AIR, AIR-2026-0016. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0016/ (accessed 2026-10-19).