Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Disclosed vulnerability

Notion AI: document edits are saved before user approval, so a markdown-image injection exfiltrates data whether or not the user accepts

AIR-2026-0005 AIR record · 2026-01-notion-ai-preapproval-exfiltration
From the supporting source
Notion AI was susceptible to data exfiltration via indirect prompt injection due to a vulnerability in which AI document edits are saved before user approval.promptarmor.com
The record
Disclosed
2026-01-07
Vendor
Notion
Product
Notion AI
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — Notion AI saved the edit and fetched the exfiltration image pre-approval
Attack surface
Enterprise assistant
Autonomy level
Assistant
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection document
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
NIST AI RMF
MAP 4.2
EU AI Act
Article 10
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 23894
AIUC-1
A. Data & Privacy
Scope
tool misuse
Mitigation
Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Notion AI users processing untrusted documents (e.g. candidate resumes)
Capability abused
document_editmarkdown_image_renderingconnected_data_source_readdocument_editingimage_renderingmail_drafting
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
user approval prompt for AI document edits
Guardrail kinds
Human approval
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
remediated 2026-01-07/08
Taxonomy & references
OWASP ASI01 Agent Goal HijackOWASP ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitationindirect_prompt_injectionmarkdown_image_exfilapproval_bypasssave_before_approvalhr_data_leak
Curator notes
PromptArmor. Reported 2025-12-24, disclosed and fixed 2026-01-07. Demo scenario: a poisoned resume PDF leaks a hiring tracker (salary expectations, candidate feedback, diversity goals). The core defect is an ordering bug in the approval flow - 'Whether or not the user accepts the edit, the attacker successfully exfiltrates the data.' Distinct from 2025-09-notion-lethal-trifecta (Code Integrity, Notion 3.0 agents). | Merged from duplicate id `2026-01-notion-ai-unpatched-exfiltration`. Also reported as: 'Notion AI writes and saves exfiltration URLs into documents before user approval'.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Notion AI: document edits are saved before user approval, so a markdown-image injection exfiltrates data whether or not the user accepts". AIR, AIR-2026-0005. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2026-0005/ (accessed 2026-10-19).