Disclosed vulnerability
ForcedLeak: CRM data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via Web-to-Lead prompt injection
AIR-2025-0139 AIR record · 2025-09-salesforce-forcedleak
From the supporting source
enable external attackers to exfiltrate sensitive CRM data through an indirect prompt injection attack.noma.security
The record
Disclosed
2025-09-25
Vendor
Salesforce
Product
Salesforce Agentforce
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — Agentforce retrieved CRM records and rendered the exfiltration link
Attack surface
Enterprise assistant
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection web form
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.2
- EU AI Act
- Article 10
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 23894
- AIUC-1
- A. Data & Privacy
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
any org running Agentforce with Web-to-Lead enabled
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
Content Security Policy domain allowlist
Guardrail kinds
Output filter, Permission scope
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
Salesforce enforced Trusted URLs for Agentforce & Einstein on 2025-09-08 and re-secured the expired allowlisted domain
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Noma Security (Noma Labs). CVSS 9.4 per Noma. Reported to Salesforce 2025-07-28, fixed 2025-09-08, published 2025-09-25. The CSP bypass used an expired but still-allowlisted Salesforce domain that Noma re-registered for $5. No CVE assigned. No known exploitation in the wild.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "ForcedLeak: CRM data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce via Web-to-Lead prompt injection". AIR, AIR-2025-0139. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2025-0139/ (accessed 2026-10-19).