Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Research demo

SpAIware in Windsurf Cascade: prompt injection writes itself into long-term memory for persistent exfiltration

AIR-2025-0111 AIR record · 2025-08-windsurf-spaiware-memory-persistence
From the supporting source
persist instructions into future chat sessionsembracethered.com
The record
Disclosed
2025-08-22
Vendor
Codeium / Windsurf
Product
Windsurf (Cascade agent)
Risk domain
Reliability and observability › Data and memory poisoning
Also touches
Privilege escalation, Data exfiltration channels, Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the injection wrote itself into Cascade memory with no approval
Attack surface
Agent memory
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection repo content
Impact type
Data exfiltration, Persistence, Integrity loss, Persistent memory poisoning, Remote code execution
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI06 – Memory & Context Poisoning
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0020 – Poison Training Data
NIST AI RMF
MEASURE 3.1
EU AI Act
Article 15
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 24029-1; 23894
AIUC-1
D. Reliability
Scope
agent failure
Mitigation
Monitor model performance; Implement feedback diversity and circuit breakers.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
all future chat sessions of an affected Windsurf user
Capability abused
memory_writeauto_tool_invocationnetwork_egresstool_invocationcode_execution
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
none - create_memory was invoked without user approval
Guardrail kinds
None
Guardrail outcome
Not applicable
Fix shipped
none at time of publication; vendor unresponsive for three months
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Johann Rehberger, 22 Aug 2025. The Cascade create_memory tool ran without approval, so a single injection in a source file installs instructions that survive across sessions and keep exfiltrating - the writeup states it 'compromises confidentiality, integrity and availability of all future chat conversations'. Disclosed 30 May 2025; vendor largely unresponsive. This is the canonical memory-poisoning demo against a shipped developer product. Also reported as: 'Windsurf SpAIware: persistent prompt injection written into Cascade long-term memory'.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "SpAIware in Windsurf Cascade: prompt injection writes itself into long-term memory for persistent exfiltration". AIR, AIR-2025-0111. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2025-0111/ (accessed 2026-10-19).