Disclosed vulnerability
Amazon Q Developer leaks secrets via DNS because ping and dig were allowlisted as read-only
AIR-2025-0103 AIR record · 2025-08-amazon-q-dns-exfil
From the supporting source
Yes, Amazon Q leaked contents of the `.env` file via a `ping` request without the developer's consent.embracethered.com
The record
Disclosed
2025-08-18
Vendor
Amazon Web Services
Product
Amazon Q Developer VS Code extension
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Credential theft, Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — Amazon Q ran ping/dig to exfiltrate secrets over DNS
Attack surface
Coding agent
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection source code
Impact type
Data exfiltration, Credential theft
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.2
- EU AI Act
- Article 10
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 23894
- AIUC-1
- A. Data & Privacy
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Amazon Q Developer users (~1M)
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
command approval for mutating commands only
Guardrail kinds
Human approval
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
patched by AWS (version not stated); AWS declined to publish a CVE or advisory despite rating it CVSS High
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
Month of AI Bugs. Directly analogous to CVE-2025-55284 in Claude Code.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Amazon Q Developer leaks secrets via DNS because ping and dig were allowlisted as read-only". AIR, AIR-2025-0103. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2025-0103/ (accessed 2026-10-19).