Research demo
Supabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database: a support-ticket injection makes the developer's agent run a service_role query that bypasses RLS
AIR-2025-0053 AIR record · 2025-07-supabase-mcp-sql-exfiltration
From the supporting source
The core problem of LLMs interacting with tools is that they can not distinguish instructions from data.generalanalysis.com
The record
Disclosed
2025-07-06
Vendor
Supabase
Product
Supabase MCP server
Risk domain
Privacy › Data exfiltration channels
Also touches
Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the agent ran the service_role query and wrote the data into a public reply
Attack surface
MCP server
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection support ticket
Impact type
Data exfiltration
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI02 – Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024 – Exfiltration via AI Inference API
- NIST AI RMF
- MAP 4.2
- EU AI Act
- Article 10
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 23894
- AIUC-1
- A. Data & Privacy
- Scope
- tool misuse
- Mitigation
- Monitor network traffic for anomalous patterns; Restrict egress destinations.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Supabase projects whose developers run the MCP server with service_role credentials
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
Postgres Row-Level Security (bypassed by service_role)
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Fix shipped
no patch; mitigations are read-only mode and prompt injection filters
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
General Analysis. DATE CAVEAT: Simon Willison linked and covered this on 2025-07-06, which is used as date_disclosed; the page itself now shows 'Published April 10, 2026 (Reviewed May 1, 2026)', apparently a re-dating of the article. The stolen integration_tokens are unreachable to the human support agent's own credentials - the escalation comes entirely from the developer's MCP session running as service_role. Canonical worked example of Willison's lethal trifecta.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Supabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database: a support-ticket injection makes the developer's agent run a service_role query that bypasses RLS". AIR, AIR-2025-0053. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2025-0053/ (accessed 2026-10-19).