Research demo
Indirect prompt injection in a PDF makes Claude Computer Use run a filesystem-destroying command
AIR-2024-0044 AIR record · 2024-10-anthropic-claude-computer-use-rm-rf
From the supporting source
we’ll share how an indirect prompt injection can cause Claude Computer Use to perform one of the most destructive commands in the Unix/Linux environment: deleting all the system files via the command “rm -rf /”.hiddenlayer.com
The record
Disclosed
2024-10-24
Vendor
Anthropic
Product
Claude Computer Use (public beta reference implementation)
Risk domain
Agent behaviour › Unsafe actuation
Also touches
Privilege escalation, Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — Claude Computer Use ran the destructive command via its bash tool
Attack surface
Computer-use agent
Autonomy level
Semi-autonomous
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection document
Impact type
Data destruction, Code execution
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- ASI01 – Agent Goal Hijack
- MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0048 – External Harms
- NIST AI RMF
- MEASURE 2.6; MANAGE 1.3
- EU AI Act
- Annex III §1(c)
- ISO/IEC
- TR 24028; 24029-1; 23894
- AIUC-1
- C. Safety
- Scope
- agent misuse
- Mitigation
- Require confirmation for destructive actions; Implement dry-run modes; Use layered safety controls.
- Taxonomy
- Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
Claude Computer Use containers/hosts processing untrusted documents
Capability abused
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
Claude refusal guardrails
Guardrail kinds
Unknown
Guardrail outcome
Silent
Taxonomy & references
Curator notes
HiddenLayer. Payload was base64/ROT13-obfuscated and framed as a 'safe test environment' to defeat refusal behaviour.
Supporting sources
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "Indirect prompt injection in a PDF makes Claude Computer Use run a filesystem-destroying command". AIR, AIR-2024-0044. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2024-0044/ (accessed 2026-10-19).