Agent Incident RegistryAIR
v1 · updated 19 Oct 2026
Disclosed vulnerability

ChatGPT Chat with Code plugin: prompt injection turns private GitHub repos public and steals source

AIR-2023-0013 AIR record · 2023-06-openai-chat-with-code-plugin
From the supporting source
Over the last few months I reached out to OpenAI about these issues many times (at least four) with little to no success or feedback.embracethered.com
The record
Disclosed
2023-06-20
Vendor
OpenAI (third-party plugin)
Product
ChatGPT Chat with Code plugin
Risk domain
Agent behaviour › Unsafe actuation
Also touches
Sensitive data exposure, Confused deputy
System type
Generative model
Who acted
Agent acted — the plugin performed OAuth-authorised repo writes, making private repos public
Attack surface
Skill / plugin
Autonomy level
Assistant
Initial vector
Indirect prompt injection web content
Impact type
Unauthorized action, Source code theft, Privacy violation
Confidence
High
Submitted by
EAI Internal
Crosswalk
OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
ASI01 – Agent Goal Hijack
MITRE ATLAS
AML.T0048 – External Harms
NIST AI RMF
MEASURE 2.6; MANAGE 1.3
EU AI Act
Annex III §1(c)
ISO/IEC
TR 24028; 24029-1; 23894
AIUC-1
C. Safety
Scope
agent misuse
Mitigation
Require confirmation for destructive actions; Implement dry-run modes; Use layered safety controls.
Taxonomy
Enkrypt AI agent risk taxonomy · Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery
Blast radius
users who installed the plugin and authorized GitHub OAuth
Capability abused
oauth_authorized_plugin_actionsrepository_write
Defense & remediation
Recorded defense
none - the plugin took actions without user confirmation
Guardrail kinds
None
Guardrail outcome
Not applicable
Fix shipped
the plugin was later removed from the store (see the 2023-07-06 follow-up post); OpenAI added store criteria requiring user confirmation before actions
Taxonomy & references
OWASP ASI01 Agent Goal HijackOWASP ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuseconfused_deputyoauth_abuseno_user_confirmation
Curator notes
Johann Rehberger. Earliest widely cited case of an LLM plugin performing destructive OAuth-authorized actions from injected instructions.
Cite as
Enkrypt AI. "ChatGPT Chat with Code plugin: prompt injection turns private GitHub repos public and steals source". AIR, AIR-2023-0013. https://agentincident.vercel.app/i/AIR-2023-0013/ (accessed 2026-10-19).