{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0296",
 "incident_id": "2026-10-dream-php2shell-firewall-ai-assisted-rooting",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-109618",
  "CVE-2026-109619",
  "CVE-2026-46300"
 ],
 "defense_present": null,
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Palo Alto Networks is releasing fixed PAN-OS versions across the affected branches",
 "date_occurred": "2026-10-23",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-10-26",
 "title": "Dream: suspected AI-assisted PHP2Shell chain rooted 25 PAN-OS servers, including three in a US government-affiliated environment",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "ai_assisted_exploit_development",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "exploit_development",
  "script_generation"
 ],
 "target_product": "Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls and management servers; Claude Code and the aiscan platform found on attacker infrastructure",
 "target_vendor": "Palo Alto Networks",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": true,
 "impact_type": [
  "unauthorized_access",
  "credential_theft",
  "persistence"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "25 PAN-OS servers rooted across the US, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, three in a US government-affiliated environment; 22 left parked with web shells",
 "taxonomy": {
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "in_the_wild",
   "ai_assisted_offense",
   "exposed_attacker_infrastructure",
   "realized_harm"
  ],
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI03"
  ]
 },
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://dreamgroup.com/blog/chained-php2shell-exploit-roots-25-servers",
  "https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/php2shell-attack-roots-25-servers.html"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "On October 25, Dream researchers uncovered artifacts of what appeared to be a Chinese AI-assisted campaign that rooted 25 servers, including systems in a US government-affiliated environment.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "The intrusion is well documented, and Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 independently verified the attacker's tooling and results; the AI's part in it is not. Claude Code was installed, aiscan was configured with DeepSeek and Kimi models and its session logs hold Chinese-language user messages, and the style of about 40 scripts suggests AI-assisted development. But Dream says it has no direct evidence the AI tools wrote the exploit or the scripts, and that this does not appear to be a fully autonomous attack. The record is therefore coded at the lowest autonomy level with a person as the actor, and its place here rests on that inference. Credential exposure is confirmed for the decrypted LDAP service account; whether the password spray, backdoor accounts or SAML key extraction succeeded is unknown. Unit 42 tracks this activity as CL-UNK-1280. Victims differ from the European government breach in AIR-2026-0292, which involves the same flaws, and neither account links the two. Dream's report is cited as a directly supplied source outside the routine weekly source list.",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Credential & Secret Theft",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "human_acted_on_output",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "artifacts suggest AI helped build the tooling, but nothing shows an agent executing the intrusion",
 "vector_family": "other",
 "vector_detail": "ai_assisted_exploit_development",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-109618",
   "CVE-2026-109619",
   "CVE-2026-46300"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI03",
 "agent_framework": "claude_code",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "threat_intel",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Credential & Secret Theft",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}