{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0212",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-exposed-ai-infrastructure-exploitation-campaign",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08-26",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Exploitation campaign against exposed AI infrastructure: Microsoft's investigations of compromised LiteLLM, RAGFlow and Kestra workloads, and Wiz honeypot telemetry of the same MCP RCE chain, blind prompt injection and in-memory credential theft",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "agent_framework",
 "initial_vector": "unauthenticated_exploitation_of_exposed_ai_gateway",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "model_proxying",
  "backend_credential_holding",
  "workflow_execution",
  "credential_configuration_flow",
  "mcp_test_endpoint",
  "shell_tool",
  "memory_resident_secrets"
 ],
 "target_product": "LiteLLM, RAGFlow, Kestra (self-hosted AI infrastructure)",
 "target_vendor": "multiple (BerriAI/LiteLLM, Infiniflow/RAGFlow, Kestra)",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": true,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "unauthorized_database_access",
  "data_exfiltration",
  "cryptomining",
  "persistence",
  "remote_code_execution"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Multiple real customer environments investigated by Microsoft Defender across three distinct AI workloads; Wiz's 90-day honeypots mimicking LiteLLM, Flowise, LangChain, Langflow, ChromaDB and Ollama recorded the same tooling",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-42271",
  "CVE-2026-48710",
  "CVE-2026-49869",
  "CVE-2026-59822"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI05",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "in_the_wild",
   "realized_harm",
   "credential_theft",
   "cryptomining",
   "ai_infrastructure",
   "postgresql_exfiltration",
   "persistence"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": null,
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": null,
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/08/26/when-ai-infrastructure-becomes-target-securing-gateways-control-points/",
  "https://www.wiz.io/blog/ai-infrastructure-honeypot"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Microsoft assesses with high confidence that initial access likely occurred through exploitation of the exposed LiteLLM gateway surface.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "One in-the-wild campaign observed from two vantage points, fused 2026-09-21 from two parallel drafts: Microsoft's victim investigations (Security Blog, 2026-08-26) and Wiz Threat Research's honeypot telemetry (2026-08-27, Yaara Shriki). The same CVE-2026-42271 + CVE-2026-48710 chain, the same detached cryptominer tradecraft and the same in-memory LiteLLM key theft appear in both, so a second vendor's telemetry of the same attacker tooling is evidence for one record, not a second incident. MICROSOFT: three real Defender investigations. LiteLLM: entry consistent with the 42271+48710 chain; the attacker read the gateway PID-1 environment for the master key, provider keys and DATABASE_URL, reached Azure PostgreSQL and dumped LiteLLM_ProxyModelTable and LiteLLM_VerificationToken; miner plus SSH-key persistence. RAGFlow: SSRF-style recon, in-process RCE and a Python hook in the TenantLLM credential flow (low confidence on the specific CVE). Kestra: workflow-origin shell execution and XMRig, initial access via CVE-2026-49869. Guidance: 'Treat AI gateways as Tier-0 secrets stores.' WIZ: (1) CVE-2026-59822 auth bypass with single-character Bearer tokens and the 42271+48710 chain for unauthenticated RCE dropping a Monero miner, with Wiz linking the Qilin ransomware group to active exploitation; (2) blind prompt injection against LangChain, Flowise, OpenWebUI and Node-RED using DNS OAST callbacks to confirm shell-tool execution (reconstructed payload), ending in XMRig; (3) AI-native post-exploitation reading the LiteLLM master key from Python module memory and staging a miner under an /app/data/.claude/ directory renamed 'unicorn'. impact_realized TRUE on Microsoft's real victims; honeypots alone would not qualify. Xref AIR-2026-0187 (LiteLLM vulnerability umbrella): this record is the distinct exploitation campaign with its own realized-harm question, per the split rule in CURATION.md.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "exposed AI gateways and frameworks were exploited as infrastructure; blind prompt injection sought agent execution but the models did not act on their own",
 "vector_family": "conventional_vulnerability",
 "vector_detail": "unauthenticated_exploitation_of_exposed_ai_gateway",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-42271",
   "CVE-2026-48710",
   "CVE-2026-49869",
   "CVE-2026-59822"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI05",
 "agent_framework": "mcp_server",
 "model_provider": "microsoft",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "vendor_disclosure",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: credential_theft",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI05 (impact=code_exec); ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}