{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0199",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-google-gemini-cli-wif-gcp-compromise",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08-18",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "A WIF of fresh access: a prompt-injected GitHub issue on Gemini CLI escalates to Editor-level access on a Google GCP project",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_github_issue",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "ci_workflow_execution",
  "shell_execution",
  "file_read",
  "network_egress"
 ],
 "target_product": "google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli; @google/gemini-cli triage workflow",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "fully_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "privilege_escalation",
  "remote_code_execution"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Google GCP projects backing the Gemini CLI CI/CD automation",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "ci_cd_agent",
   "workload_identity_federation",
   "oidc_credential_theft",
   "log_masking_bypass",
   "deprecated_tool_scoping"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "GitHub Actions secret log masking; tool allowlist via coreTools",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "fixed - serviceAccountTokenCreator scoped to specific resources, OIDC credentials added to .geminiignore, tool scoping logic updated; verified 2026-08-14",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/a-wif-of-fresh-access-how-a-github-issue-on-gemini-cli-led-to-gcp-project-compromise"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The only wrinkle is log masking. GitHub masks tokens and secrets in action logs, so gemini has to be asked to chunk the output into groups of 4 characters.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security (Dan Lisichkin). Reported 2026-06-11, fix verified 2026-08-14, published 2026-08-18 with a Google bounty. Chain: public issue -> autonomous triage agent with over-broad tools (deprecated coreTools field) -> RCE on the runner -> plaintext WIF/OIDC credentials -> service account impersonation -> Editor on the GCP project. The 4-character chunking trick to defeat GitHub's secret masking is reusable and worth tracking as a technique.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the CI agent executed and escalated to Editor on the GCP project",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_github_issue",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "gemini_cli",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: credential_theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI04 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec), ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}