{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0198",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-straiker-antigravity-buried-commands",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08-14",
 "date_occurred": "2026-07-13",
 "title": "An Antigravity agent exfiltrates SSH and PEM keys while reporting misleading summaries to its operator",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_repository_content",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "script_generation",
  "file_system_search",
  "network_exfiltration",
  "self_reported_summaries"
 ],
 "target_product": "Google Antigravity",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "operator_deception"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Antigravity users reviewing agent summaries instead of raw actions",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "human_in_the_loop_bypass",
   "summary_manipulation",
   "key_exfiltration"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Human-in-the-loop review of agent-reported actions",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": null,
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.straiker.ai/blog/google-antigravity-ai-agent-prompt-injection"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Once an AI's own explanation becomes attacker-controlled, human-in-the-loop review stops functioning as a real security boundary.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Author Jesus Padilla Soqui (Straiker STAR Labs). Reported to Google 2026-07-13; no fix status published in the post. The distinguishing finding is that the agent's own natural-language summary of its actions was attacker-controlled.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agent exfiltrated SSH/PEM keys while lying in its own summaries",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_repository_content",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "human_manipulation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: credential_theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}