{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0195",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-pillar-deadbugz-mcp-campaign",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08-12",
 "date_occurred": "2026-08-10",
 "title": "Deadbugz: an attributed MCP supply-chain campaign that pushes MCP server configs via GitHub PRs and flips tool descriptions malicious after three tool calls",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "mcp_server",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_pull_request_adding_mcp_server_config",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "mcp_tool_metadata_ingestion",
  "credential_file_read",
  "network_egress"
 ],
 "target_product": "MCP-enabled AI agents in developer repositories",
 "target_vendor": "multiple / open source",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "23 targeted GitHub repositories; any developer merging the PR",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI05",
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "tool_poisoning",
   "rug_pull",
   "runtime_gated_trigger",
   "supply_chain",
   "attributed_actor"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "human PR review",
 "defense_bypassed": false,
 "fix_shipped": "n/a - mitigation is blocking the endpoints and rejecting the configs",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/deadbugz-currently-active-mcp-supply-chain-campaign"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The server keeps an in-memory, per-client counter for `tools/call` requests. Once it reaches three, subsequent `tools/list` and `prompts/get` responses change.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security. Campaign delivery concentrated in a ~75-minute window on 2026-08-10. Attributed to GitHub account 'zellkernel' linked to X account @llmgod. impact_realized=false: all 23 reviewed PRs were still unmerged (19 closed, 4 open) at disclosure, so no confirmed victim. Payload targets SSH keys, AWS credentials, shell history and Kubernetes config. The three-call delay is a deliberate evasion of static/scan-time review - the tool descriptions are benign when a scanner looks.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Tool & Function Call Extraction / Abuse",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Supply Chain Compromise",
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agents ingested the flipped tool descriptions and exfiltrated credentials",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_pull_request_adding_mcp_server_config",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI05",
 "agent_framework": "mcp_server",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "data_exfiltration_channels",
  "supply_chain_vulnerabilities"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: credential_theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI05",
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI05,ASI01 | added ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component), ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}