{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0185",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-atlassian-rovo-exfiltration",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08-05",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Atlassian Rovo: zero-click Jira/Confluence exfiltration via a poisoned uploaded file, bypassing web-search controls",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "jira_search",
  "confluence_search",
  "connector_retrieval",
  "web_search_tool"
 ],
 "target_product": "Atlassian Rovo",
 "target_vendor": "Atlassian",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Rovo tenants; any data the agent can reach in Atlassian and via connectors",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "zero_click",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "control_bypass",
   "unfixed"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "organization-level web search controls in Rovo",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "none; unresolved at publication",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/atlassian-rovo-exfiltrates-data"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Atlassian's Rovo AI is susceptible to zero-click data exfiltration via indirect prompt injection, bypassing organization-level web search controls.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PromptArmor. Disclosed to Atlassian 2026-05-23, acknowledged 2026-05-25, follow-ups 2026-06-04 and 2026-07-29, published 2026-08-05 with the note 'Rovo remains vulnerable as of the release of this article.' Distinct from and concurrent with Varonis's RovoBlast; two independent injection paths into the same assistant.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Rovo searched Jira/Confluence and exfiltrated via the poisoned file",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}