{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0178",
 "incident_id": "2026-08-zoom-ai-agent-takeover",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-08",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Attacker takes over Zoom AI (ZoomMate) through a malicious Skill and keeps a live command channel",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_skill_plugin",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "skill_code_execution",
  "meeting_transcript_retrieval",
  "connector_retrieval",
  "outbound_network"
 ],
 "target_product": "Zoom AI Companion / ZoomMate",
 "target_vendor": "Zoom",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "remote_control",
  "persistence"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Zoom tenants where users can upload Skills; all data ZoomMate can reach including connected sources",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "malicious_skill",
   "interactive_c2",
   "persistence",
   "tool_supply_chain"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "the agent's stop control did not terminate the attacker's connection",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "none; PromptArmor states there is no specific vulnerability to disclose to Zoom because the behavior is as intended",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/attacker-takes-over-zoom-ai"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The attacker can target data from across Zoom that ZoomMate has access to, including connected data sources.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PromptArmor. The page shows no publication date; the YYYY-MM in the incident_id is approximate (found in an August 2026 sweep) and date_disclosed is left null rather than guessed. Notable property: 'the attacker's connection can remain active even if the user clicks stop on the agent and closes Zoom'; an interactive command channel rather than one-shot exfiltration. PromptArmor frames it as intended-by-design behavior of Skills, so there is no vendor fix. Overlaps the skill/plugin supply-chain records; kept here because the impact is Zoom-tenant enterprise data. | date_disclosed is recorded to the month only; no source establishes the exact day.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the malicious Skill ran inside Zoom AI and held a live command channel",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_skill_plugin",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component); ASI05 (vector=code_exec)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}