{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0168",
 "incident_id": "2026-07-pillar-docker-socket-sandbox-escape",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-07-20",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "One Docker socket to rule them all: escaping the Codex, Cursor and Gemini CLI sandboxes through a privileged local daemon",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "agent_sandbox_escape_via_privileged_daemon",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "docker_socket_access",
  "container_creation",
  "host_filesystem_mount"
 ],
 "target_product": "OpenAI Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI / Anysphere / Google",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "remote_code_execution",
  "persistence"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "developers running these agents on machines with Docker Desktop",
 "cve": [
  "GHSA-v4xv-rqh3-w9mc"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "sandbox_escape",
   "confused_deputy_daemon",
   "virtiofs_mount",
   "shell_rc_persistence"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "seatbelt/sandbox profiles restricting the agent process",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Cursor fixed (GHSA-v4xv-rqh3-w9mc, High); OpenAI marked informational, no CVE; Google deemed it documented behavior, no fix",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/one-docker-socket-to-rule-them-all-escaping-codex-cursor-and-gemini-clis-sandboxes"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "A closed sandbox profile controls what the agent's own process can ask the kernel for. It does not control what a privileged local daemon will do on the agent's behalf.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security, Day 2 of the 'Week of Sandbox Escapes' series (2026-07-20). Reaches the home directory (SSH keys, credentials, browser data) and can modify shell rc files for persistence. The divergent vendor responses to the same finding are themselves notable.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Credential & Secret Theft",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agents escaped their sandboxes through the Docker socket",
 "vector_family": "other",
 "vector_detail": "agent_sandbox_escape_via_privileged_daemon",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "sandbox_isolation"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": [
   "GHSA-v4xv-rqh3-w9mc"
  ]
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Credential & Secret Theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI04 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec), ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}