{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0150",
 "incident_id": "2026-07-hallusquatting-agent-supply-chain",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-07-01",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "HalluSquatting: registering hallucinated package and skill names to make AI coding assistants install attacker code",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "hallucinated_dependency_resolution",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "package_installation",
  "skill_installation",
  "shell_execution",
  "autonomous_dependency_resolution",
  "repo_cloning"
 ],
 "target_product": "Cursor; Windsurf; GitHub Copilot; Cline; Gemini CLI; OpenClaw-family assistants",
 "target_vendor": "multiple",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "remote_code_execution",
  "supply_chain_compromise",
  "arbitrary_code_execution",
  "botnet_recruitment"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "any agent that resolves and installs dependencies without a human reading the package name",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.T0010"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "slopsquatting",
   "package_hallucination",
   "phantom_dependency",
   "skill_squatting",
   "no_human_checkpoint",
   "hallucination_exploitation",
   "skill_installation",
   "agentic_botnet"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "none in the tested agents; classic slopsquatting relied on a human noticing an odd package name, and agentic resolution removes that checkpoint",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "none - mitigation is allowlisting, lockfiles, provenance and pre-install verification",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/new-hallusquatting-attack-could-trick.html"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "They ran it against tools including Cursor, Windsurf, GitHub Copilot, Cline, Google's Gemini CLI, and the OpenClaw family of assistants, getting each to run attacker code.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Aya Spira and colleagues in Ben Nassi's group (Tel Aviv University), with Stav Cohen (Technion) and Ron Bitton (Intuit). The hallucinated names reproduced in up to 85% of repository requests and 100% of skill installs across models and phrasings. Real-world corroboration exists but is separate and was not independently cited, so it is recorded here as notes rather than as its own record: the npm package 'unused-imports' (hallucinated in place of eslint-plugin-unused-imports, still ~233 weekly downloads in early Feb 2026 despite being security-held) and 'react-codeshift', which Aikido's Charlie Eriksen found in January 2026 had already propagated into 237 projects with agents still trying to install it. | Merged from duplicate id `2026-07-hallusquatting-coding-agents`. Also reported as: 'HalluSquatting: registering the repo, package and skill names coding agents reliably hallucinate'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the coding assistants resolved and installed the squatted packages",
 "vector_family": "other",
 "vector_detail": "hallucinated_dependency_resolution",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "none"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "not_applicable",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.T0010"
  ],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI05"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "override",
 "asi_reason": "override: Registering hallucinated package and skill names is a supply-chain attack whose reach comes from many assistants independently suggesting the same name, not from one fault spreading between agents; the botnet label that triggered the cascade rule describes the payload's later infrastructure, not agentic fan-out.",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}