{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0146",
 "incident_id": "2026-07-openclaw-url-preview-exfiltration",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-07",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "LLM data exfiltration via messaging-app URL previews: OpenClaw's default Telegram configuration leaks data with no click",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "autonomous_ops",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "link_generation",
  "messaging_channel_output"
 ],
 "target_product": "OpenClaw (default Telegram configuration); any LLM agent replying through Telegram/Slack",
 "target_vendor": "OpenClaw",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "OpenClaw users on the default Telegram config, and LLM agents that answer in link-previewing chat apps generally",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "zero_click",
   "link_unfurling",
   "url_preview_exfil",
   "default_insecure_config"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "none by default",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "mitigation only: config change to disable link previews",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/llm-data-exfiltration-via-url-previews-(with-openclaw-example-and-test)"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "OpenClaw (the current trending agentic system) is vulnerable to this attack when using the default Telegram configuration; an example secure configuration is provided at the end of the article.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PROVENANCE CAVEAT: no publication date on the page; 2026-07 in the incident_id is provisional and date_disclosed is left null. PromptArmor Threat Intel Team. Same primitive Johann Rehberger described for Slack unfurling in 2024 (see 2025-06-anthropic-slack-mcp-unfurl), generalized here to any agent that replies into a preview-generating chat app. | date_disclosed is recorded to the month only; no source establishes the exact day.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agent emitted links whose previews leaked the data with no click",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "none"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "not_applicable",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "openclaw",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}