{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0143",
 "incident_id": "2026-06-wiz-amazon-q-mcp-autoload",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-06-26",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Amazon Q Developer for VS Code auto-loaded workspace MCP configs, giving repo-triggered code execution",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_repository_workspace_config",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "mcp_server_autoload",
  "process_spawn",
  "environment_inheritance"
 ],
 "target_product": "Amazon Q Developer Extension for VS Code (language server < 1.65.0)",
 "target_vendor": "Amazon Web Services",
 "autonomy_level": "copilot_with_approval",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "remote_code_execution",
  "credential_theft"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Developers opening an untrusted repository containing .amazonq/mcp.json",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-12957"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "mcp",
   "autoload",
   "workspace_trust_bypass",
   "cloud_credential_theft"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "VS Code workspace trust (not consulted)",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Language server 1.65.0 adds a consent prompt before loading workspace MCP servers",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.wiz.io/blog/amazon-q-vulnerability"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Amazon Q automatically loaded MCP server configurations from .amazonq/mcp.json within the workspace-no prompt, no consent, no workspace trust check.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Author Maor Dokhanian (Wiz Research). Quote's em-dash normalized to a hyphen. Spawned processes inherit the developer's full environment including AWS credentials.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Amazon Q auto-loaded the workspace MCP config and spawned processes",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_repository_workspace_config",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-12957"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "mcp_server",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft",
  "privilege_escalation"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI04 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}