{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0126",
 "incident_id": "2026-06-csa-claude-code-action-bypass",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-06-01",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Authorization bypass in claude-code-action lets any GitHub App-authored issue drive prompt injection into CI",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_issue",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "ci_pipeline_credentials",
  "repository_write",
  "issue_ingestion"
 ],
 "target_product": "claude-code-action (< v1.0.94) and @anthropic-ai/claude-code (< v1.0.93)",
 "target_vendor": "Anthropic",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "repository_compromise",
  "supply_chain_backdoor"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Public repositories running claude-code-action; any GitHub App has implicit read access and can open issues",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2025-66032"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "authorization_bypass",
   "ci_cd",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "bot_actor_spoofing"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "checkWritePermissions actor authorization check",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "claude-code-action v1.0.94 and @anthropic-ai/claude-code v1.0.93; fix deployed within four days of report",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-claude-code-github-action-prompt-injection/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The function unconditionally permitted any actor whose identity string ended in `[bot]`, on the assumption that bot actors would be legitimate GitHub Apps installed by repository owners. This assumption was incorrect.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "CSA AI Safety Initiative research note (published 2026-06-05) writing up RyotaK of GMO Flatt Security's finding. Reported 2026-01-12, fixed in four days, publicly disclosed 2026-06-01. Alias GHSA-xq4m-mc3c-vvg3. The record is dated by public disclosure; the CSA note is used as the primary source of record because it is the writeup available in citable form.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Supply Chain Compromise",
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the CI agent acted on the injected issue with repository write access",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_issue",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2025-66032"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "anthropic",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI04 | added ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}