{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0118",
 "incident_id": "2026-05-rtk-untrusted-project-filters",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-05-20",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Untrusted project-local filters in RTK: a committed .rtk/filters.toml controls what the coding agent is allowed to see",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_repository_config_file",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "command_output_filtering_layer"
 ],
 "target_product": "RTK (token optimization layer for Claude Code)",
 "target_vendor": "RTK maintainers (open source)",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "defense_evasion",
  "integrity_violation"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "RTK users (50k+ GitHub stars) opening untrusted repositories",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-45792"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "context_manipulation",
   "evidence_suppression",
   "untrusted_config_autoload",
   "perception_layer_attack"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "none - project-local filters were loaded automatically without approval or warning",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "RTK v0.33.0 (2026-03-25): hash-based integrity verification, untrusted filters blocked by default, explicit `rtk trust` opt-in",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/untrusted-project-local-filters-in-rtk-when-your-ais-eyes-are-someone-elses-to-control"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "An attacker who controls the filtering layer doesn't need to inject anything into the model's context, only remove the evidence of what they've planted.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security (Ariel Fogel). Reported 2026-03-15, patched 2026-03-25, CVE-2026-45792 (CVSS 4.0 score 6.9) disclosed 2026-05-20. Categorically different from prompt injection: this attacks the agent's perception layer by subtraction, hiding backdoors from AI code review and security scanning rather than adding instructions.",
 "risk_category": "product_misuse",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Approval-gate bypass or erosion",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "risk_override_reason": "a file committed to the repo silently decides what the coding agent is allowed to see and do",
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "the filter layer blinds the agent, which then acts on falsified evidence",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_repository_config_file",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "none"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "not_applicable",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-45792"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "claude_code",
 "model_provider": "anthropic",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "privilege_escalation",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "policy_drift",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Approval-gate bypass or erosion",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component), ASI03 (eai_category=privilege_escalation, no code execution)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}