{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0112",
 "incident_id": "2026-05-teampcp-litellm-github-actions",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-05-12",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "TeamPCP (UNC6780) compromised LiteLLM and other GitHub repos/Actions to plant the SANDCLOCK credential stealer",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "agent_framework",
 "initial_vector": "github_actions_supply_chain_compromise",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "ci_build_environment_access",
  "cloud_secret_extraction"
 ],
 "target_product": "LiteLLM / BerriAI, Trivy, Checkmarx GitHub repositories and Actions",
 "target_vendor": "BerriAI and others",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": true,
 "impact_type": [
  "supply_chain_compromise",
  "credential_theft"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Downstream consumers of the compromised repositories and Actions; AWS keys and GitHub tokens extracted from build environments",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "supply_chain",
   "ai_gateway",
   "ci_cd"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": null,
 "defense_bypassed": null,
 "fix_shipped": null,
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access",
  "https://www.oligo.security/blog/new-intelligence-links-teampcp-to-shadowray-2-0-and-traces-activity-back-to-2020"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The threat actor subsequently leveraged their access to these GitHub repositories to embed the SANDCLOCK credential stealer and extract high-value cloud secrets, such as AWS keys and GitHub tokens, directly from affected build environments.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Notable because LiteLLM is an AI gateway that proxies multiple LLM providers - compromising it puts the attacker astride other organisations' model traffic and keys. GTIG explicitly calls out the expanding AI-platform attack surface. Oligo separately links TeamPCP to the ShadowRay 2.0 campaign; that Oligo URL was surfaced via archive index but not independently cited, so the quote is from the GTIG post.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "a GitHub Actions supply-chain compromise of an AI gateway repo",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "github_actions_supply_chain_compromise",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "vendor_disclosure",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component); ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}