{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0101",
 "incident_id": "2026-05-grok-bankrbot-morse-code-token-drain",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-05-05",
 "date_occurred": "2026-05-04",
 "title": "Morse-code prompt injection made Grok relay a transfer instruction to Bankrbot, draining ~$150-200k in tokens",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "multi_agent_system",
 "initial_vector": "obfuscated_prompt_injection_social_post",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "agent_to_agent_relay",
  "wallet_transfer",
  "auto_provisioned_wallet"
 ],
 "target_product": "Grok (X) and Bankrbot trading agent",
 "target_vendor": "xAI, Bankr",
 "autonomy_level": "fully_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": true,
 "impact_type": [
  "financial_loss",
  "theft"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "3 billion DRB tokens (reported at $150,000-$200,000) from Grok's auto-provisioned Bankr wallet",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI07",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "encoding_obfuscation_bypass",
   "agent_to_agent_trust",
   "excessive_agency",
   "crypto_agent"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Grok content filters on plaintext instructions",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "funds reportedly returned or converted; no publicly documented product fix",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.giskard.ai/knowledge/how-grok-got-prompt-injected-an-x-user-drained-150-000-from-an-ai-wallet",
  "https://incidentdatabase.ai/cite/1556"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The target of the attack was Grok's auto-provisioned Bankr wallet. Bankr is a crypto trading agent on X (formerly Twitter) that automatically creates a linked crypto wallet for every X account it interacts with, including Grok's. xAI held no admin keys; whoever could influence Grok's X activity effectively controlled the wallet.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "AI Incident Database incident 1556. Two failures compound: Morse encoding defeated the input filter, and a second agent treated Grok's relayed message as authorised. Reported loss figures differ between sources ($150k vs $200k).",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Multi-agent contagion"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Grok relayed the instruction and Bankrbot executed the transfer",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "obfuscated_prompt_injection_social_post",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "prompt_instruction"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [
   1556
  ],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "xai",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "unsafe_actuation",
 "eai_domain": "agent_behaviour",
 "eai_secondary": [],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: unsafe_actuation",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI07 (vector=inter_agent), ASI02 (eai_category=unsafe_actuation)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}