{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0096",
 "incident_id": "2026-05-google-gemini-cli-yolo-supply-chain",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-04-24",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "From a public GitHub issue to commits on gemini-cli's main branch: --yolo mode ignored the fine-grained tool allowlist in the triage workflow",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_github_issue",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "ci_workflow_execution",
  "shell_execution",
  "file_read",
  "git_push_with_persisted_credentials"
 ],
 "target_product": "Gemini CLI (@google/gemini-cli) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "fully_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "supply_chain_compromise",
  "credential_theft",
  "remote_code_execution"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "all downstream users of gemini-cli (repo has 101k+ stars)",
 "cve": [
  "GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g",
  "CVE-2026-13745"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "ci_cd_agent",
   "yolo_mode",
   "allowlist_ignored",
   "credential_persistence_in_git_config",
   "supply_chain"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "fine-grained tool allowlist in settings.json",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "gemini-cli 0.39.1 / 0.40.0-preview.3; run-gemini-cli action 0.1.22; advisory GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g published 2026-04-24",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/my-agentic-trust-issues-from-prompt-injection-to-supply-chain-compromise-on-gemini-cli",
  "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13745"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Tool allowlists now enforced under --yolo mode. Previously, running Gemini CLI with --yolo caused it to ignore any fine-grained tool allowlist in settings.json.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security (Dan Lisichkin). Reported 2026-04-16, advisory 2026-04-24, blog 2026-05-05. Same repo and broadly the same entry point as 2026-08-google-gemini-cli-wif-gcp-compromise but a different defect and different escalation path (supply-chain commit vs GCP privilege escalation). Credential persistence in the runner's git config is what turned RCE into a supply-chain write. Update 2026-09-21: CVE-2026-13745 was assigned to this advisory (GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g); NVD describes arbitrary code execution in Gemini CLI via untrusted local .env files overriding GEMINI_CLI_HOME, fixed in run-gemini-cli 0.1.22.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Supply Chain Compromise",
  "Credential & Secret Theft",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the CI agent executed and pushed commits to main under --yolo",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_github_issue",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-13745"
  ],
  "ghsa": [
   "GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g"
  ]
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "gemini_cli",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: credential_theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI05"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI05 | added ASI04 (vector=supply_chain), ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}