{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0087",
 "incident_id": "2026-04-hermes-px-pypi-ai-proxy",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-04-05",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "hermes-px: PyPI 'privacy' AI proxy that hijacked a university LLM endpoint, shipped a stolen Claude Code system prompt, and exfiltrated every prompt",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "agent_framework",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_pypi_package_posing_as_ai_infrastructure",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "llm_request_proxying",
  "prompt_and_response_capture"
 ],
 "target_product": "hermes-px (PyPI), marketed as an OpenAI-compatible secure AI inference proxy",
 "target_vendor": "unaffiliated; impersonated 'EGen Labs / AXIOM-1'",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": true,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "prompt_theft",
  "unauthorized_resource_use",
  "ip_theft"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "every user prompt and model response logged to an attacker Supabase instance; a Tunisian university's private inference endpoint abused as free upstream",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI05",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "pypi_malware",
   "prompt_exfiltration",
   "stolen_system_prompt",
   "tor_bypass"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "PyPI publishing controls",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "reported by JFrog; removal recommended",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://research.jfrog.com/post/hermes-px-pypi/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The user thinks they are using a privacy-focused AI proxy, but they are actually abusing a stolen university endpoint.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "JFrog Security Research. Bundled base_prompt.pz, a ~246,000-character near-complete copy of Anthropic's Claude Code system prompt rebranded as AXIOM-1. Upstream hijacked: https://prod.universitecentrale.net:9443/api/v1/chat/completions/. Exfil to https://urlvoelpilswwxkiosey.supabase.co/rest/v1/requests_log over the user's direct connection, defeating the advertised Tor anonymity. Three-layer string encryption used to hide indicators.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy",
  "product_misuse"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "a malicious PyPI proxy captured prompts and hijacked an LLM endpoint",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_pypi_package_posing_as_ai_infrastructure",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI05",
 "agent_framework": "claude_code",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI05"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI05 | added ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component), ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}