{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0055",
 "incident_id": "2026-03-google-chrome-gemini-glic-privilege-escalation",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-03-02",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "CVE-2026-0628: malicious Chrome extension injects script into the privileged Gemini Live panel to reach camera, mic, files and screenshots",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "browser_agent",
 "initial_vector": "extension_script_injection_into_privileged_browser_page",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "camera_access",
  "microphone_access",
  "file_system_access",
  "screenshot_capture"
 ],
 "target_product": "Gemini in Chrome (chrome://glic Gemini Live side panel)",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "surveillance",
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Chrome users with Gemini before 143.0.7499.192 who install a malicious extension",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-0628"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "privilege_escalation",
   "webview_tag",
   "declarativeNetRequest",
   "privileged_page_injection",
   "extension_permission_model"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Chrome extension sandbox and privileged-page isolation (insufficient policy enforcement in the WebView tag)",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Chrome 143.0.7499.192/.193, January 2026",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/new-chrome-vulnerability-let-malicious.html"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Insufficient policy enforcement in WebView tag in Google Chrome prior to 143.0.7499.192 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to inject scripts or HTML into a privileged page via a crafted Chrome extension.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Found by Gal Weizman (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42), reported 2025-11-23, CVSS 8.8. The AI panel is a browser-internal privileged surface holding capabilities (camera, mic, filesystem, screen capture) far beyond a web page's; the extension used declarativeNetRequest to get script into it. Illustrates that the agent's own UI surface is now a privilege boundary. Researcher writeup by Unit 42 is not used as the source here; THN carries the CVE text verbatim.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy",
  "product_misuse"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "a malicious extension injected script into a privileged browser page",
 "vector_family": "other",
 "vector_detail": "extension_script_injection_into_privileged_browser_page",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "sandbox_isolation",
  "abuse_detection"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-0628"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI04 | added ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}