{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0021",
 "incident_id": "2026-01-pillar-clawdbot-gateway-attack-traffic",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-01-29",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Caught in the wild: protocol-aware attack traffic hitting exposed Clawdbot/OpenClaw gateways within minutes of a honeypot going live",
 "class": "in_the_wild",
 "attack_surface": "autonomous_ops",
 "initial_vector": "direct_attack_on_exposed_agent_gateway",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "websocket_rpc_control_plane",
  "credential_store",
  "conversation_history"
 ],
 "target_product": "Clawdbot / OpenClaw gateway (pre-2026-01-26 versions)",
 "target_vendor": "OpenClaw",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "data_exfiltration",
  "remote_control"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "internet-exposed Clawdbot gateways on unpatched versions",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI06",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "honeypot_telemetry",
   "protocol_downgrade",
   "client_impersonation",
   "exposed_control_plane",
   "opportunistic_scanning"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "gateway authentication (patched 2026-01-13 to 2026-01-26)",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "upstream patches 2026-01-13 to 2026-01-26",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/caught-in-the-wild-real-attack-traffic-targeting-exposed-clawdbot-gateways"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "Every captured RPC method the attackers probed has a real handler",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security honeypot study. impact_realized=false because the observed traffic hit a honeypot, not confirmed real victims - but the traffic itself is real and ongoing. Attackers bypassed the AI layer entirely and spoke the WebSocket control protocol directly, with a three-phase playbook (recon, enumeration, exploitation); 67% of traffic from a single source IP (144.31.99.48). Successful compromise yields Anthropic/OpenAI API keys, gateway credentials, Telegram/Discord/Slack channel tokens, conversation history and a multi-node infrastructure map. Complements 2026-01-clawdbot-exposed-control-interfaces (exposure census) with the attacker-side view. verified_quote is a verbatim clause.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Credential & Secret Theft",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "attack traffic aimed at exposed agent gateways",
 "vector_family": "conventional_vulnerability",
 "vector_detail": "direct_attack_on_exposed_agent_gateway",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "authentication"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI06",
 "agent_framework": "openclaw",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Credential & Secret Theft",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI06"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI06 | added ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}