{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0012",
 "incident_id": "2026-01-cursor-shell-builtin-env-poisoning",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-01-14",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "The agent security paradox: Cursor's implicitly trusted shell built-ins (export, typeset, declare) allow silent environment poisoning to sandbox bypass and RCE",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_to_shell_builtin_abuse",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "shell_execution",
  "environment_variable_write",
  "zsh_parameter_expansion"
 ],
 "target_product": "Cursor",
 "target_vendor": "Anysphere (Cursor)",
 "autonomy_level": "copilot_with_approval",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "remote_code_execution",
  "persistence"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Cursor users relying on command allowlists",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2026-22708"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "allowlist_bypass",
   "shell_builtin_abuse",
   "environment_poisoning",
   "persistence",
   "sandbox_escape"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "command classification and approval; allowlist of trusted commands",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "fixed January 2026 - explicit user approval now required for unclassified commands; Cursor discouraged allowlist reliance",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.pillar.security/blog/the-agent-security-paradox-when-trusted-commands-in-cursor-become-attack-vectors"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "By abusing implicitly trusted shell built-ins like `export`, `typeset`, and `declare`, threat actors can silently manipulate environment variables.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Pillar Security (Dan Lisichkin). Reported 2025-08-11, acknowledged as systemic September 2025, fixed January 2026, CVE-2026-22708. Same structural failure as the Amazon Q and Copilot CLI allowlist bypasses: the classifier reasons about command names, not about what an invocation can actually do.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agent executed shell built-ins that poisoned its own environment",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_to_shell_builtin_abuse",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval",
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2026-22708"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "cursor",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "privilege_escalation",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: privilege_escalation",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI04 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}