{
 "public_id": "AIR-2026-0002",
 "incident_id": "2026-01-promptarmor-claude-code-marketplace-hijack",
 "date_disclosed": "2026-01",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Hijacking Claude Code via injected marketplace plugins: hooks that rewrite the permissions file and auto-approve commands",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "skill_plugin",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_plugin_marketplace_auto_listed_by_registry",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "hooks",
  "permission_configuration",
  "shell_execution",
  "file_read"
 ],
 "target_product": "Claude Code plugin marketplaces; claudecodemarketplaces.com registry",
 "target_vendor": "Anthropic (Claude Code) / third-party registry",
 "autonomy_level": "copilot_with_approval",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "destructive_action",
  "remote_control"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "any Claude Code user who adds an untrusted marketplace",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI05",
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "plugin_marketplace",
   "hooks_abuse",
   "human_in_the_loop_bypass",
   "brand_impersonation",
   "unvetted_registry"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Claude Code human approval for dangerous commands",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "unknown",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/hijacking-claude-code-via-injected-marketplace-plugins"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "It automatically scrapes GitHub to find new ones every hour. This means that they will list a malicious Marketplace in their registry for people to discover within an hour of an attacker making it public!",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PROVENANCE CAVEAT: the page carries no publication date, only a '(c) 2026' footer; the 2026-01 in the incident_id is provisional, not a verified date, and date_disclosed is left null. PromptArmor research. Attack path: a fake GitHub account impersonating Anthropic publishes marketplace metadata, the third-party registry auto-scrapes and lists it within an hour, and the plugin's hooks either rewrite the permissions configuration to allow curl, or auto-approve command types before the approval prompt reaches the user. Demonstrated outcomes: file deletion and a reverse shell. | date_disclosed is recorded to the month only; no source establishes the exact day.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy",
  "brand_trust"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Supply Chain Compromise",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "injected plugin hooks rewrote permissions and auto-approved the agent's commands",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_plugin_marketplace_auto_listed_by_registry",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI05",
 "agent_framework": "claude_code",
 "model_provider": "anthropic",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "supply_chain_vulnerabilities",
 "eai_domain": "tool_misuse",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "unsafe_actuation",
  "privilege_escalation",
  "data_exfiltration_channels"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Supply Chain Compromise",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI05",
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI05,ASI01 | added ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component), ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}