{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0151",
 "incident_id": "2025-10-microsoft-cophish",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-10-20",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "CoPhish: Copilot Studio agents used as a Microsoft-hosted wrapper for OAuth consent phishing",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "malicious_agent_configuration",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "agent_login_redirect",
  "demo_website_hosting",
  "oauth_consent_flow"
 ],
 "target_product": "Microsoft Copilot Studio",
 "target_vendor": "Microsoft",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "credential_theft",
  "token_theft",
  "account_takeover"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Entra ID tenants where users can consent to apps; phishing pages hosted on copilotstudio.microsoft.com",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI04",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "consent_phishing",
   "trusted_domain_abuse",
   "token_theft",
   "agent_platform_abuse"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Entra ID default app consent policy",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Microsoft announced changes to the default application consent policy in late October 2025; administrative users remained exposed",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/cophish-using-microsoft-copilot-studio-as-a-wrapper/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "a Copilot Studio agent's 'Login' settings can redirect a user to any URL, including an OAuth consent attack.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Datadog Security Labs, published 2025-10-20 (updated 2025-10-28). Some press coverage described this as a 'campaign'; the Datadog writeup is a proof of concept and does not claim observed in-the-wild exploitation, so class is responsible_disclosure and impact_realized is false. The abuse of a genuine microsoft.com-hosted agent URL is what defeats URL-reputation defenses.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Credential & Secret Theft",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "the Copilot Studio agent redirected the user into the OAuth consent attack",
 "vector_family": "malicious_component",
 "vector_detail": "malicious_agent_configuration",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI04",
 "agent_framework": "m365_copilot",
 "model_provider": "microsoft",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "credential_theft",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "privilege_escalation"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Credential & Secret Theft",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI04 (vector_family=malicious_component); ASI03 (eai_category=credential_theft)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}