{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0149",
 "incident_id": "2025-10-openai-agent-builder-mcp-exfil",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-10-14",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "OpenAI Agent Builder: a poisoned lead-form submission redirects a multi-agent sales workflow into emailing Salesforce CRM records to the attacker",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "multi_agent_system",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_form_submission",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "mcp_tool_invocation",
  "crm_read",
  "email_send",
  "agent_to_agent_message_passing"
 ],
 "target_product": "OpenAI Agent Builder",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Agent Builder workflows that ingest untrusted external submissions",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02",
   "ASI07"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "multi_agent_propagation",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "guardrail_passthrough",
   "crm_exfil"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "OpenAI guardrails and structured outputs",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "none; OpenAI acknowledged and recommended human-in-the-loop controls, noting protections 'aren't foolproof'",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://promptarmor.substack.com/p/data-exfiltration-in-openai-agent"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "even if a model identifies a prompt injection—it can still be passed verbatim from one agent to another, allowing for the manipulation of agents deeper in the workflow",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "PromptArmor. The multi-agent finding matters independently of the exfil: detecting an injection at the first hop does not stop it, because the flagged text is still relayed downstream. Same family as ForcedLeak (2025-09-salesforce-forcedleak) but against OpenAI's workflow builder.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the multi-agent workflow emailed CRM records to the attacker",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_form_submission",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "salesforce_agentforce",
 "model_provider": "openai",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI02"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI02 | added ASI07 (vector=inter_agent)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}