{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0140",
 "incident_id": "2025-09-google-gemini-trifecta",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-09-30",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Gemini Trifecta: log-to-prompt, search-history and browsing-tool injection across Google's Gemini suite",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_multi",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "log_summarization",
  "search_personalization",
  "browsing_tool",
  "saved_memory_retrieval",
  "log_ingestion",
  "browser_history_context",
  "outbound_browsing_requests",
  "cloud_resource_access"
 ],
 "target_product": "Gemini Cloud Assist, Gemini Search Personalization Model, Gemini Browsing Tool",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "phishing",
  "privacy_violation",
  "unauthorized_cloud_access"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Google Cloud tenants using Gemini Cloud Assist; Gemini users with saved information and location data",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "log_poisoning",
   "history_poisoning",
   "link_rendering_exfil",
   "log_injection",
   "search_injection",
   "exfiltration_channel"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "partial; Gemini did not sufficiently separate user input from attacker-supplied content",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Google stopped rendering hyperlinks in log summarization responses, hardened search personalization, and blocked exfiltration from the browsing tool in indirect prompt injections",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-trifecta-how-three-new-gemini-vulnerabilities-in-cloud-assist-search-model-and-browsing"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The GCP product team made a change to stop rendering hyperlinks in the responses for all log summarization responses",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Tenable Research (Liv Matan). Cloud Assist injection was delivered through an HTTP User-Agent header that lands in Cloud Logging and is later summarized by Gemini; a pure log-to-prompt path. The Search Personalization vector overlaps with the browser-agent records. All three were remediated before publication; no CVEs assigned. Also reported as: 'Gemini Trifecta: log injection, search-history injection and browsing-tool exfiltration in Google's Gemini suite'.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Gemini ingested poisoned logs and made outbound requests",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_multi",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "sensitive_data_exposure",
  "human_manipulation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}