{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0136",
 "incident_id": "2025-09-cross-agent-privilege-escalation",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-09-24",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Cross-agent privilege escalation: one hijacked coding agent rewrites another agent's config to free it",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "multi_agent_system",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_source_code",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "file_write",
  "config_modification",
  "mcp_tool_invocation"
 ],
 "target_product": "GitHub Copilot, Claude Code, AWS Kiro (cross-agent chain)",
 "target_vendor": "multiple",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "privilege_escalation",
  "remote_code_execution"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "developer machines running more than one coding agent over the same workspace",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2025-53773"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI07",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "cross_agent",
   "config_poisoning",
   "mcp_injection",
   "privilege_escalation"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "per-agent approval prompts",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "not fixed as a class; MSRC considered the demo not severe enough to require immediate security servicing",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/cross-agent-privilege-escalation-agents-that-free-each-other/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "What starts as a single indirect prompt injection can quickly escalate into a multi-agent compromise, where one agent 'frees' another agent and sets up a loop of escalating privilege and control.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger. Key insight: agents write each other's config files (.vscode/settings.json, .mcp.json, CLAUDE.md) without approval.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Tool & Function Call Extraction / Abuse",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Prompt Injection",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Unauthorized Access & Account Takeover",
  "Multi-agent contagion"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "one agent rewrote another agent's config to free it, then executed",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_source_code",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2025-53773"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "privilege_escalation",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: privilege_escalation",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI07 (attack_surface=multi_agent_system + compromised exchange), ASI05 (impact=code_exec), ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}