{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0129",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-embracethered-month-of-ai-bugs",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-30",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "The Month of AI Bugs: 29 working prompt-injection exploits across shipped coding agents",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_repo_content",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "code_execution",
  "file_write",
  "network_egress",
  "memory_write",
  "mcp_tool_call"
 ],
 "target_product": "ChatGPT Codex; Cursor; Devin AI; OpenHands; Claude Code; GitHub Copilot; Google Jules; Amazon Q Developer; Windsurf; Cline; AWS Kiro; Amp Code; Manus AI",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI; Anysphere; Cognition; All Hands AI; Anthropic; GitHub/Microsoft; Google; Amazon/AWS; Codeium; Cline; Sourcegraph; Manus",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "code_execution",
  "data_exfiltration",
  "credential_theft",
  "persistence"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "every major AI coding agent reviewed had at least one vulnerability",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2025-53773",
  "CVE-2025-55284",
  "CVE-2025-54132"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI06",
   "ASI05"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "campaign",
   "coding_agent",
   "lethal_trifecta",
   "zombai"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "per-vendor approval prompts, allowlists and injection filters",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "varied by vendor; some fixed within days, some unmitigated at wrap-up",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/wrapping-up-month-of-ai-bugs/",
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/",
  "https://monthofaibugs.com/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The Month of AI Bugs is done",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger (wunderwuzzi / Embrace The Red), August 2025 - one post per day, 29 distinct vulnerabilities. Umbrella record; individual high-severity items are broken out as their own records in this corpus. Also presented as 'Agentic ProbLLMs: Exploiting AI Computer-Use And Coding Agents' at 39C3 (Dec 2025). Every one of these is simultaneously a responsible disclosure; kept here because the artifact is a public research demonstration series against named shipped products.",
 "is_umbrella": true,
 "umbrella_constituents": [
  "2025-08-openai-codex-zombai",
  "2025-08-cursor-mermaid-exfiltration",
  "2025-08-devin-expose-ports",
  "2025-08-openhands-zombai",
  "2025-08-claude-code-dns-exfil",
  "2025-08-github-copilot-yolo-rce",
  "2025-08-google-jules-zombai",
  "2025-08-amazon-q-developer-rce",
  "2025-08-perplexity-comet-brave-injection",
  "2025-08-windsurf-spaiware-memory-persistence",
  "2025-08-manus-vscode-port-exposure",
  "2025-08-aws-kiro-rce",
  "2025-08-cline-data-exfiltration",
  "2025-08-agenthopper-ai-virus"
 ],
 "umbrella_reason": "Series-level record retained for discovery context; individually cataloged demonstrations are listed and excluded in without-umbrella sensitivity counts.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Tool & Function Call Extraction / Abuse",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Prompt Injection",
  "Credential & Secret Theft",
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "29 shipped agents executed code, wrote files and egressed data under injection",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_repo_content",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "input_classifier",
  "human_approval",
  "permission_scope"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2025-53773",
   "CVE-2025-55284",
   "CVE-2025-54132"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft",
  "privilege_escalation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: data_exfiltration_channels",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI04 | added ASI06 (signal=memory), ASI05 (impact=code_exec)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}