{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0128",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-agenthopper-ai-virus",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-29",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "AgentHopper: a universal prompt-injection payload that hops between shipped coding agents",
 "class": "research_demo",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_repo_content",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "config_file_write",
  "auto_approve_toggle",
  "code_execution",
  "git_operations",
  "file_write",
  "config_modification",
  "git_push"
 ],
 "target_product": "GitHub Copilot; Amazon Q Developer; AWS Kiro; Amp Code",
 "target_vendor": "GitHub/Microsoft; Amazon/AWS; Sourcegraph",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "code_execution",
  "self_propagation",
  "persistence",
  "remote_code_execution"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "developer machines and any Git project the infected agent touches",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2025-53773"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI04",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI08"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "ai_virus",
   "universal_payload",
   "cross_agent_contagion",
   "yolo_mode",
   "worm",
   "cross_agent",
   "self_propagation"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "per-agent approval gates and configuration protections",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "all targeted vulnerabilities patched by the vendors",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/agenthopper-a-poc-ai-virus/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "The idea was to have one prompt injection payload that would operate across agents and exploit them accordingly.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger, 29 Aug 2025. One payload fingerprints which coding agent is reading it and fires the matching exploit (e.g. writing chat.tools.autoApprove into .vscode/settings.json for Copilot, a fake MCP server config for Amp Code). Research PoC; the article does not indicate the code was released. This is the clearest cross-vendor agent-virus demonstration against shipped products prior to the 2026 OpenClaw worm wave. | Merged from duplicate id `2025-08-embracethered-agenthopper`. Also reported as: 'AgentHopper: a proof-of-concept AI virus that self-propagates across coding agents via prompt injection'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Persistence & Covert C2",
  "Multi-agent contagion"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the payload made each agent write config and execute, hopping onward",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_repo_content",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2025-53773"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "microsoft",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "privilege_escalation",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: privilege_escalation",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01",
  "ASI04"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01,ASI04 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec), ASI08 (signal=cascade)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}