{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0093",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-github-copilot-yolo-rce",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-12",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "GitHub Copilot RCE: prompt injection writes chat.tools.autoApprove into .vscode/settings.json ('YOLO mode')",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "coding_agent",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_source_file_or_web_content",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "file_write",
  "config_modification",
  "shell_execution",
  "browser_use",
  "settings_modification",
  "shell_command_execution"
 ],
 "target_product": "GitHub Copilot in Visual Studio Code / Visual Studio",
 "target_vendor": "GitHub/Microsoft",
 "autonomy_level": "copilot_with_approval",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "remote_code_execution",
  "full_host_compromise",
  "code_execution",
  "self_propagation"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "all VS Code plus Copilot agent-mode users prior to the August 2025 Patch Tuesday",
 "cve": [
  "CVE-2025-53773"
 ],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI05",
   "ASI08"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.T0051.001"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "self_approval_escalation",
   "config_file_write",
   "wormable",
   "human_in_the_loop_bypass",
   "yolo_mode",
   "approval_bypass",
   "config_poisoning",
   "self_escalation",
   "indirect_prompt_injection"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "per-tool user confirmation prompts in Copilot agent mode",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Microsoft August 2025 Patch Tuesday (reported 2025-06-29)",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/github-copilot-remote-code-execution-via-prompt-injection/"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "It is achieved by placing Copilot into YOLO mode by modifying the project's `settings.json` file.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red). The agent disables its own approval gate by writing \"chat.tools.autoApprove\": true, then runs arbitrary shell commands. Rehberger demonstrated wormable variants; related vectors include .vscode/tasks.json and planting fake MCP servers. Affects Windows, macOS and Linux. | Merged from duplicate id `2025-08-github-copilot-yolo-mode-rce`. Also reported under the titles: 'GitHub Copilot / VS Code wormable remote code execution via prompt injection (CVE-2025-53773)'; 'GitHub Copilot: remote code execution by writing settings.json to enable YOLO mode (CVE-2025-53773)'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Remote Code Execution & Sandbox Escape",
  "Multi-agent contagion"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agent disabled its own approval gate then executed",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_source_file_or_web_content",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "human_approval"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.T0051.001"
  ],
  "cve": [
   "CVE-2025-53773"
  ],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "github_copilot",
 "model_provider": "microsoft",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "privilege_escalation",
 "eai_domain": "access_control_and_permissions",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: privilege_escalation",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI05 (impact=code_exec), ASI08 (signal=cascade)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}