{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0086",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-zenity-agentflayer",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-06",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "AgentFlayer: zero-click exploit chains silently hijacking enterprise AI agents at Black Hat USA 2025",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_email_and_ticket",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "connector_access",
  "memory_write",
  "tool_use",
  "autonomous_action"
 ],
 "target_product": "OpenAI ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot Studio, Salesforce Einstein, Google Gemini, Microsoft 365 Copilot, Cursor with Jira MCP",
 "target_vendor": "multiple",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "memory_poisoning",
  "credential_theft",
  "workflow_manipulation"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Zenity reports 3,000+ Copilot Studio agents found vulnerable to internal tool exposure",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI06",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "zero_click",
   "memory_poisoning",
   "enterprise_agent",
   "black_hat"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": null,
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Partial: OpenAI and Microsoft patched; several vendors declined, calling the behavior intended functionality",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/zenity-labs-exposes-widespread-agentflayer-vulnerabilities-allowing-silent-hijacking-of-major-enterprise-ai-agents-circumventing-human-oversight-302523580.html"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "These aren't theoretical vulnerabilities, they're working exploits with immediate, real-world consequences.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Presented by Michael Bargury and Tamir Ishay Sharbat, 'AI Enterprise Compromise: 0Click Exploit Methods'. Primary source used is Zenity's own press release; labs.zenity.io hosts the per-exploit technical writeups. Marketing language in the quote should not be read as evidence of in-the-wild abuse.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "the agents read connectors, wrote memory and took autonomous actions",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_email_and_ticket",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "eai_domain": "reliability_and_observability",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft",
  "data_exfiltration_channels",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: data_and_memory_poisoning",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI06 (eai_category=data_and_memory_poisoning), ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}