{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0084",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-openai-agentflayer-chatgpt-connectors",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-06",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "AgentFlayer: 0-click exfiltration of Google Drive secrets via poisoned document through ChatGPT Connectors",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "connector_retrieval",
  "file_ingestion",
  "image_rendering",
  "file_search",
  "url_fetch"
 ],
 "target_product": "ChatGPT Connectors (Google Drive)",
 "target_vendor": "OpenAI",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "credential_theft"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "ChatGPT users with Connectors enabled to Google Drive and similar stores",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "zero_click",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "invisible_text",
   "markdown_image_exfil",
   "url_allowlist_bypass",
   "image_markdown_exfil"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "OpenAI url_safe client-side URL check before rendering images",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "OpenAI had mitigations in place; researchers bypassed url_safe using Azure Blob Storage URLs",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentflayer-chatgpt-connectors-0click-attack-5b41",
  "https://zenity.io/research/agentflayer-vulnerabilities",
  "https://labs.zenity.io/p/agentflayer-chatgpt-connectors-0click-attack-5b41"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "As attackers all we need to do is poison a document with an invisible prompt injection payload and wait for someone to upload it into ChatGPT.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Author: Tamir Ishay Sharbat, Zenity Labs, published 2025-08-06 and presented at Black Hat USA 2025 as part of AgentFlayer. Zenity's research hub states: 'Attack simulation allowed for the hijacking of ChatGPT sessions using just an email address. Once compromised, they gain access to Google Drive, manipulate memory, and exfiltrate sensitive data - all without user input.' No CVE assigned. Also reported as: 'AgentFlayer: zero-click exfiltration of Google Drive secrets via ChatGPT Connectors'.",
 "risk_category": "security_fraud",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "privacy"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Prompt Injection",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [
  "Credential & Secret Theft"
 ],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "ChatGPT searched Drive and rendered the exfiltration image",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_document",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "unknown",
 "model_provider": "multiple",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "external_researcher",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "credential_theft",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: data_exfiltration_channels",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}