{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0083",
 "incident_id": "2025-08-google-gemini-calendar-promptware",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-08-06",
 "date_occurred": null,
 "title": "Invitation Is All You Need: Gemini promptware via Google Calendar invites reaching Workspace and smart-home actions",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "enterprise_assistant",
 "initial_vector": "indirect_prompt_injection_calendar_invite",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "calendar_read_write",
  "workspace_tools",
  "smart_home_control",
  "device_apis",
  "video_stream",
  "retrieval",
  "auto_context_ingestion",
  "app_agents",
  "geolocation",
  "video_call",
  "calendar_retrieval",
  "gmail_agent",
  "home_automation_control",
  "app_launching",
  "video_call_initiation"
 ],
 "target_product": "Google Gemini (web, Android app, Assistant)",
 "target_vendor": "Google",
 "autonomy_level": "assistant",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "data_exfiltration",
  "physical_world_action",
  "location_tracking",
  "unauthorized_tool_invocation",
  "physical_actuation",
  "spam_propagation",
  "phishing",
  "surveillance",
  "spam"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "Gemini for Workspace users; anyone who can send the victim a calendar invite",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI01",
   "ASI02"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [
   "AML.CS0063"
  ],
  "labels": [
   "promptware",
   "cyber_to_physical",
   "delayed_trigger",
   "invite_as_injection_channel",
   "delayed_tool_invocation",
   "physical_world_impact",
   "zero_click",
   "indirect_prompt_injection",
   "cyber_physical_impact"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Gemini prompt-injection mitigations",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Google shipped mitigations following disclosure",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.safebreach.com/blog/invitation-is-all-you-need-hacking-gemini/",
  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/main/dist/v6/ATLAS-2026.07.yaml",
  "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.12175"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "we were able to demonstrate a number of different exploitations of Targeted Promptware against Gemini that were initiated simply by an attacker sending a Google Calendar invite to a victim whose name contained an indirect prompt injection.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "SafeBreach Labs with Tel Aviv University / Technion collaborators. Notable as one of the first demonstrated cyber-to-physical consequences (opening windows, controlling boilers) from an LLM prompt injection. Also reported under the titles: 'Invitation Is All You Need: promptware attacks on production Gemini assistants via Google Calendar invites'; 'Invitation Is All You Need: promptware hijacks Gemini for Workspace agents via a Google Calendar invite'.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [
  "product_misuse"
 ],
 "risk_subcategory": "Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "agent_acted",
 "agency_debatable": false,
 "agency_reason": "Gemini invoked Workspace and smart-home tools, actuating devices",
 "vector_family": "indirect_prompt_injection",
 "vector_detail": "indirect_prompt_injection_calendar_invite",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "unknown"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [
   "AML.CS0063"
  ],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI01",
 "agent_framework": "google_gemini_workspace",
 "model_provider": "google",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "data_exfiltration_channels",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [
  "human_manipulation",
  "confused_deputy"
 ],
 "eai_reason": "subcategory: Data Exfiltration via Context",
 "asi_curated": [
  "ASI01"
 ],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "curated_plus_rule",
 "asi_reason": "curated: ASI01 | added ASI02 (impact=tool_misuse)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}