{
 "public_id": "AIR-2025-0042",
 "incident_id": "2025-06-asana-mcp-cross-tenant-exposure",
 "date_disclosed": "2025-06-16",
 "date_occurred": "2025-05-01",
 "title": "Asana MCP server bug could expose other organisations' tasks and projects to cross-tenant reads",
 "class": "responsible_disclosure",
 "attack_surface": "mcp_server",
 "initial_vector": "tenant_isolation_flaw_in_mcp_implementation",
 "agent_capability_abused": [
  "mcp_tool_queries",
  "retrieval_across_tenant_boundary",
  "retrieval",
  "cross_tenant_context_assembly"
 ],
 "target_product": "Asana MCP server",
 "target_vendor": "Asana",
 "autonomy_level": "semi_autonomous",
 "impact_realized": false,
 "impact_type": [
  "potential_data_exposure",
  "data_exposure",
  "cross_tenant_leakage"
 ],
 "blast_radius": "All customers who used the MCP server between 1 May and 4 June 2025",
 "cve": [],
 "taxonomy": {
  "owasp_asi": [
   "ASI03"
  ],
  "mitre_atlas": [],
  "labels": [
   "multi_tenancy",
   "mcp_server_bug",
   "exposure_window",
   "tenant_isolation_failure",
   "no_adversary_required",
   "saas_ai_connector"
  ]
 },
 "defense_present": "Intended tenant isolation",
 "defense_bypassed": true,
 "fix_shipped": "Server taken offline and fixed 4 June 2025; customers notified 16 June 2025",
 "primary_sources": [
  "https://www.upguard.com/blog/asana-discloses-data-exposure-bug-in-mcp-server",
  "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/asana-warns-mcp-ai-feature-exposed-customer-data-to-other-orgs/",
  "https://www.nudgesecurity.com/post/asana-mcp-server-data-exposure-incident"
 ],
 "verified_quote": "There is no indication that attackers exploited the bug or that other users actually viewed the information accessible through the MCP bug.",
 "confidence": "high",
 "notes": "Included with the in-the-wild records rather than the disclosure records because it is one of the few cases where a production MCP integration at a major SaaS vendor had a live tenant-isolation defect for five weeks. impact_realized is false on Asana's statement that no cross-tenant reads are known to have occurred; the exposure was real but unexercised as far as anyone can show. Also reported as: 'Asana MCP server tenant-isolation flaw exposed customer data across organizations'.",
 "risk_category": "privacy",
 "risk_secondary": [],
 "risk_subcategory": "Unclassified",
 "risk_sub_secondary": [],
 "ai_entity": "generative",
 "agency": "ai_as_target",
 "agency_debatable": true,
 "agency_reason": "a tenant isolation flaw in the MCP implementation",
 "vector_family": "other",
 "vector_detail": "tenant_isolation_flaw_in_mcp_implementation",
 "guardrail_kind": [
  "sandbox_isolation"
 ],
 "guardrail_outcome": "silent",
 "xrefs": {
  "aiid": [],
  "atlas": [],
  "cve": [],
  "ghsa": []
 },
 "primary_asi": "ASI03",
 "agent_framework": "mcp_server",
 "model_provider": "unknown",
 "model_name": "",
 "detection_mechanism": "unknown",
 "tool_access": "unknown",
 "financial_loss_band": "unknown",
 "eai_category": "sensitive_data_exposure",
 "eai_domain": "privacy",
 "eai_secondary": [],
 "eai_reason": "impact rule: sensitive_data_exposure",
 "asi_curated": [],
 "asi_scope": "in_scope",
 "asi_provenance": "rule",
 "asi_reason": "ASI03 (signal=identity)",
 "submitted_by": "EAI Internal"
}